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Abstract 
This paper presents a simple conceptualization of generalization, called other-settings 
generalization, that is valid for any IS researcher who claims that his or her results have 
applicability beyond the sample where data were collected.  An other-settings generalization is the 
researcher’s act of arguing, based on the representativeness of the sample, that there is a 
reasonable expectation that a knowledge claim already believed to be true in one or more settings 
is also true in other clearly defined settings.  Features associated with this conceptualization of 
generalization include (a) recognition that all human knowledge is bounded, (b) recognition that 
all knowledge claims—including generalizations—are subject to revision, (c) an ontological 
assumption that objective reality exists, (d) a scientific-realist definition of truth, and (e) 
identification of the following three essential characteristics of sound other-settings 
generalizations: (1) the researcher must clearly define the larger set of things to which the 
generalization applies; (2) the justification for making other-settings generalizations ultimately 
depends on the representativeness of the sample, not statistical inference;  (3) representativeness 
is judged by comparing key characteristics of the proposition being generalized in the sample and 
target population. The paper concludes with the recommendation that future empirical IS research 
should include an explicit discussion of the other-settings generalizability of research findings. 
Keywords:  Research methodology, other-settings generalization, OSG, external validity 
 
Introduction 
This paper presents a simple conceptualization of generalization, called other-settings generalization, that is valid for 
any Information Systems (IS) researcher who claims that his or her results have applicability beyond the sample 
where data were collected.  The reasons that a paper on this topic is needed are as follows.  First, as Lee and 
Baskerville (2003) point out, IS is an applied discipline. It is therefore important that the likely implications for 
practitioners of IS research findings be laid out as clearly as possible.  Second, with increasing globalization of IS 
research, it is likely that due to important cultural and institutional differences, findings from studies in one country 
or culture may not apply directly in other countries.  The applicability of findings between different contexts 
therefore needs to be discussed clearly.  Third, all knowledge claims are bounded.  Therefore, as Dubin (1969) and 
Whetten (1989) point out, rigorous research must identify the boundaries of applicability of any theories.  Fourth, 
there is a mounting body of evidence, e.g. see Lee and Baskerville (2003) and King and He (2005), that many 
published IS research reports, even in the top journals, handle generalizations of knowledge claims poorly.   
With regard to the fourth point above, many quantitative researchers collect survey data with response rates of the 
order of 30% (King and He 2005, Table 5), yet proceed to report p-values from statistical packages as if they are 
automatically meaningful.  Equally, as Lee and Baskerville (2003) have shown, many case-study researchers issue 
disclaimers that their findings are not generalizable to other settings, although many such findings clearly do have 
relevance to other settings.  Turning to the review process, our experience has been that many reviewers draw 
unsound conclusions about generalizability of research findings, and reject papers based on invalid rules of thumb 
such as “you can’t generalize from a single case”, or “you can’t generalize from a sample of students”, or “I am not 
convinced that the non-random, non-representative nature of the evidence is going to result in valid findings”.  In 
short, the handling of generalizability issues in IS research is challenged in many dimensions. 
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To address these issues, and to add weight to the arguments of Lee and Baskerville (2003) and King and He (2005), 
this paper presents a summary of the fundamentals of generalization that integrates, simplifies, and in some cases re-
organizes the work of many prior researchers.  None of the individual points we raise in this paper is fundamentally 
new, but the aggregation is new. We call this aggregation of ideas, defined in Table 1, “other-settings 
generalization” (OSG).  “Other settings” include both the population from which the sample was or might 
conceptually have been drawn, and other populations beyond the sample population, e.g. those in other countries or 
cultures where the results of the study might also apply.  OSG is a very important subset of the broad 2x2 
framework presented by Lee and Baskerville (2003)1.  This subset is important because when most researchers talk 
of the generalizability or external validity of research findings, e.g. King and He (2005), the concept they seem to 
have in mind is other-settings generalizability. 
Table 1. Summary of Key Characteristics of Other-Settings Generalization (OSG) 
Definition 
An other-settings generalization is the researcher’s act of arguing, based on the representativeness 
of the sample, that there is a reasonable expectation that a knowledge claim already believed to be 
true in one or more settings is also true in other clearly defined settings.   
Key Characteristics of sound other-settings generalizations 
1. All human knowledge is bounded 
2. All knowledge claims, including generalizations, are subject to revision 
3. Objective reality exists (this is a soft-positivist ontological stance) 
4. Truth beyond reasonable doubt is sufficient (this is a scientific-realist definition of truth) 
5. The only sound basis for generalization of knowledge claims is the representativeness of the 
sample(s) on which the knowledge claim is based 
6. Representativeness is demonstrated by comparing key characteristics of the proposition 
being tested in the sample and target population 
 
It is important to draw some boundaries for this paper.  First, although other-settings generalizations are of interest 
in all the social sciences, in this paper we restrict our attention to other-settings generalizations in information 
systems.  We do this because the publications we examine in the next section come only from the IS literature.  We 
do, however, revisit the question of the generalizability of our claims to other social-science disciplines, towards the 
end of this paper.  Second, we also assume that readers are familiar with the principles of inferential statistics, 
including the concepts of sample, sampling frame, and population, and understand that p-values (e.g. “**, p<0.05”) 
calculated by most statistical packages assume data have come from a random sample and are not automatically 
meaningful if the sample studied is not a random sample. 
Returning to our main argument, according to Weber (2004, p. vi), the objective of all researchers is to “enhance 
their understanding of the world (whatever the world might be)”.  However, attempts to understand how the world 
works are inevitably incomplete because researchers have limited cognitive capabilities and only localized 
understandings of what they and prior researchers see and have seen.  Recognizing these limitations, Dubin (1969) 
and Whetten (1989) suggest that researchers who build theories and models to explain how the world works should 
specify clearly the boundaries to their knowledge claims.  Surprisingly, however, few IS researchers attempt to 
delineate clearly the boundaries beyond which their research findings might not apply. To improve this situation, we 
argue that IS researchers, both positivists and interpretivists, should normally be expected to include a discussion of 
the potential generalizability, and limits to generalizability, of findings of any empirical study in any research paper.  
The remainder of this paper is structured in three parts. First, we summarize the mounting evidence that 
generalization is poorly handled in IS research.  Second, in the main body of the paper, we present the aggregation 
                                                          
1 Lee and Baskerville’s (2003) framework accommodates many different types of concepts that various authors have 
called generalization.  Our conceptualization of OSG corresponds to Lee and Baskerville’s second types of EE and 
ET generalization “beyond the sample or domain from which the researcher has actually collected data” (p.233).   
  Seddon & Scheepers/Other-Settings Generalization in IS Research 
 
 Twenty-Seventh International Conference on Information Systems, Milwaukee 2006 1143 
of ideas that we would like to associate with the label “other-settings generalization” (OSG).  These are the ideas 
summarized in Table 1. Finally, in a relatively brief section, we present suggestions for improving discussion of 
OSG in future IS research. 
Problems with Generalization in IS Research 
Two recent papers—Lee and Baskerville (2003) and King and He (2005)—provide an indication of some unsound 
practices in the treatment of generalization in leading IS research journals and conferences.  With respect to case 
studies, Lee and Baskerville (2003) identify a dozen studies where case-study researchers understate the likely 
generalizability of their results.  With respect to surveys, King and He (2005) show that many survey-based 
researchers mishandle generalizability claims by ignoring the fact that samples they have analyzed are unlikely to be 
representative of the populations they (often implicitly) claim to have studied.  For both types of research, we argue, 
a discussion of other-settings generalizability would provide the reader with access to useful insights the researchers 
may have about the likely limits in the applicability of their results to settings other than those on which the findings 
are based. 
Case-study Research Under-claiming Generalizability 
In their paper on generalizing in IS research, Lee and Baskerville (2003) present a list of 12 case-study research 
papers (Table 1, p.223) and state that in each case the researchers involved have applied a “statistical sampling-
based conception of generalizability” “inappropriately” in discussing their research.  What they mean by 
“inappropriately” is that the researchers have under-claimed the general applicability of their conclusions.  The 
reason for thinking that reporting in these 12 case-study-based IS research papers should be improved is that despite 
their disclaimers about the lack of generalizability from their case studies, all twelve groups of researchers (some of 
whom were using interpretive research methods) wrote as if they believed their findings were relevant to other 
settings.  In some cases, they made much stronger claims to generality in their papers than their disclaimers implied.   
For example, Robey and Sahay’s (1996) paper on the consequences of GIS adoption in their case studies of two US 
counties contains a typical disclaimer:  
“Because they are drawn from a study of two organizations, these results should not be generalized to other 
contexts.” (p.108)  
However, their language in discussing their findings speaks otherwise: 
“Because the same technology (Arc/Info) was experienced differently during its introduction in the two 
counties, the results reported here strongly support the idea that information technology’s consequences are 
socially constructed, i.e., that technology’s social consequences depend on its social meanings more than on its 
material properties.” (p.106) 
The implication of the latter statement, and, in fact, the strongest argument running through Robey and Sahay’s 
entire paper, is that “information technology’s consequences are socially constructed”.  Furthermore, the tone of the 
paper suggests that this is true for all applications of IT in all organizations (not just the two US county offices that 
were using ESRI’s ARC/INFO GIS software).  If Robey and Sahey had made this claim explicitly it would have 
been a sweeping other-settings generalization (moreover, one that we believe could be justified beyond reasonable 
doubt)!  There are similar, if less strong, mixed messages in Lee and Baskerville’s other 11 studies.  In fact, all 12 
papers make quite strong general claims, whilst simultaneously issuing caveats that their findings could not be 
generalized from the small number of cases.  We believe that in many cases the stronger claims are justified. 
External-validity Problems in Survey-based IS Research 
Campbell and Stanley’s (1963) term “external validity” is frequently used to describe the validity of generalizations 
from samples to populations.  In their study of external validity in survey-based research, King and He (2005) 
document what they call “coverage error” and “nonresponse error” in 199 empirical papers published in three top 
journals, MIS Quarterly (MISQ), Information Systems Research (ISR), and the Journal of Management Information 
Systems (JMIS) over the five years from April 1999 to April 2004.  According to King and He, coverage error is 
“introduced when the frame from which the sample is drawn does not include all relevant characteristics of the 
Quantitative Research Methods 
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population to which inferences are to be drawn” (King and He 2005, p.882), and non-response error is “introduced if 
non-respondents are different from respondents in terms of characteristics that are relevant to the study [Dillman 
2000]” (King and He 2005, p.885).   
King and He’s Table 3 shows that “over 40% of papers in all three journals ignore coverage error and almost 20% 
only mention it briefly” (p.887).   Further, their Table 6 shows that for 81 mail surveys, “well over half of all studies 
in all three journals (approx. 48%-70%) neither mentioned nor performed nonresponse analysis” (pp.888-9).  These 
are large percentages.  Since both coverage and nonresponse error are sources of problems in generalizing, King and 
He’s findings provide clear evidence that the state of IS generalization practice in survey-based research is not as 
satisfactory as it should be.  However, King and He do not discuss some key ideas that are at least as important for 
making sound generalizations in IS research.  These include (a) the idea that all knowledge claims are bounded, and 
(b) the fact that p-values calculated by statistical packages are not meaningful unless samples of data studied are 
probability samples (which most survey studies are not).  In addition, they do not consider case studies.  Therefore, 
we decided to conduct our own analysis of published papers in two top IS journals. 
Other-settings Generalizability in Recent IS Research 
In our analysis, we examined all publications in MISQ and ISR in the two years, 2003 and 2004, to assess how they 
treated the generalizability of their knowledge claims2.  During these two years, there were 38 papers published in 
ISR and 45 in MISQ, a total of 83 papers.  As King and He (2005) also report, clues about generalizability claims 
were usually in: (a) the Methodology section, where authors explained why they had chosen the sample they had, 
and, in the case of surveys, why non-response bias was (usually) not a problem in their study, and/or (b) the 
Discussion, Limitations3, Implications for researchers, Implications for management, and/or Conclusion sections, 
where authors frequently discussed why their results might be generalizable or not, or offered advice to practitioners 
on how results from their study might be useful.  Often, e.g. in Kohli and Kettinger’s (2004) action-research study or 
Bassellier et al.’s (2003) survey, it was just assumed that the relevant other setting was something like “all users or 
managers in North American companies” and that readers understood this to be the case.   
Results from our analysis are shown in Table 2.  We judged that 72 of the 83 papers were interested in some way 
with the generalizability of their findings to other settings. Analytic studies and Simulations, e.g. Fan et al. (2003), 
van der Aalst and Kumar (2003), and Raghu et al. (2004) were included in the 72 because these papers claim to 
model phenomena in the real world.  Reviews, such as Fichman (2003) and Melville et al. (2004), were also 
included in the 72 because in integrating the literature, the authors are building theories and propositions that they 
believe apply to practice.  Overall, in the 71% of the papers where other-settings generalizability was judged 
relevant, the authors wrote as if their results did have generalizability to other settings, yet only 46% of the papers 
discussed generalizability at all, and only 17% made any attempt to discuss the boundary conditions beyond which 
their theories or findings might not apply. 
Summary: The State of Generalization Practice in Empirical IS Research 
Taken together, the above three studies are consistent in showing that generalization is poorly handled in IS 
Research. Case-study researchers who claim that their results cannot be generalized are under-claiming the 
relevance of their work. Quantitative researchers who analyze samples and do not discuss boundary conditions of 
their knowledge claims are implicitly over-claiming generalizabilty of their research.  Further, in our experience, 
reviewers who reject papers based on implicit judgments about usefulness of samples for drawing “general” 
conclusions also often base those conclusions on unsound logic.   
 
                                                          
2 We deliberately restricted the sample to just two years to make the point that if the sample is carefully chosen, 
valid general claims can be based on relatively small samples.  The question is: Would the percentages in Table 1 be 
expected to change much if the sample were for, say, five years, or for a broader set of top-tier IS journals? 
3 In our sample of 83 studies, the discussion of limitations section was usually a mix of internal and external validity 
(generalizability) issues.  Despite the importance of the latter, discussion of internal validity issues often dominated. 
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Table 2. Discussion of Generalizability in Papers Published in ISR and MISQ in 2003 and 2004 












Papers where generalizability to other settings is relevant 
Survey 18 7 11 11 11 5 
Experiment 13 8 5 8 10 1 
Analytic 10 10 0 6 0  0 
Case study 8 3 5 7 6 3 
Review 6 1 5 6 2 1 
Action Research 5 0 5 3 0 0 
Archival data analysis 5 2 3 4 2 2 
Simulation 3 3 0 3 0 0 
Meta analysis 2 1 1 2 2 0 
Opinion 2  0 2 1 0 0 
Total 72 35 37 51 33 12 
  100%     71% 46% 17% 
Papers where generalizability to other settings is not relevant  
Research method 7 3 4 not applicable    
What is IS? 2 0 2 not applicable    
Design idea 1 0 1 not applicable    
Ethics 1 0 1 not applicable    
 11 3 8    
 83 38 45    
 
What is needed to solve these problems are, first, a clear understanding of what generalization means and why 
generalization matters in IS research, and second, some clear recommendations on the way generalization issues 
should be discussed in future IS research.  In the remainder of this paper, we address both these needs.  As noted 
earlier, our conceptualization of generalization is a subset of the all-encompassing 2 x 2 framework presented by 
Lee and Baskerville (2003).  However, we believe that this is the key subset to understand, because when most 
researchers talk of the generalizability or external validity of research findings, the concept they have in mind is 
other-settings generalizability.  
Other-Settings Generalization 
The world is interested in generalizations that are true.  In this section we define “truth” and “other-settings 
generalization”.  But before defining these terms, three tightly coupled questions must be answered: 
1. What is the ontological stance of this paper? 
2. What things do social science researchers attempt to generalize to other settings? 
3. Who makes other-settings generalizations, the writer or the reader of a research report? 
Quantitative Research Methods 
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First, the ontological stance of this paper is depicted in Figure 1.  Like Kirsch (2004), who describes her ontological 
position as “soft positivism”, our position is somewhere in the middle band between extreme interpretivism and 
extreme positivism4.  Specifically, we believe that objective reality exists beyond the human mind, though our 
perceptions about that reality are inextricably bound to the stream of experiences we have had throughout our lives. 
Further, we believe that there are many regularities and patterns in this objective reality that researchers seek to 
uncover, but that these regularities and patterns tend to apply in only limited contexts and are likely to be different 
for different types of people (managers, teenagers, etc.), different cultures5, and over time.  These beliefs underpin 
the remainder of the arguments in this paper. 
 
Extreme Interpretivism:
• Reality and the individual who 
observes it cannot be 
separated. Our perceptions 
about the world are inextricably 
bound to the stream of 
experiences we have had 
throughout our lives.
• Social knowledge is 
contextually dependent. Each 
situation is unique.  Therefore 
generalization is impossible. 
Klein and Myers (1999, p.75):
• Interpretive research “values the 
documentation of unique circumstances 
and is highly suspicious of any claim that 
human affairs are governed by natural laws 
that are culturally independent”.
• “Interpretive researchers in information 
systems tend not to generalize to 
philosophically abstract categories but to 
social theories such as structuration theory 
or actor network theory”.
• Principle of abstraction and generalization
Weber (2004):
• Both positivist and interpretivists
“are concerned with trying to 
enhance their understanding of the 
world (whatever the world might 
be).” (p.vi)
• “In my view, it is time to assign the 
rhetoric of positivism versus 
interpretivism to the scrap heap. It 
no longer serves a useful 
purpose.” (p.xi)
Extreme Positivism:
• Objective reality exists beyond 
the human mind. 
• Human affairs may be 
described by natural laws.
• The researcher’s job is to 
uncover those natural laws and 
provide evidence to justify other 
researchers’ belief in them.
The ontological position of this paper:
• Objective reality exists beyond the 
human mind, though our perceptions 
about that reality are inextricably bound 
to the stream of experiences we have 
had throughout our lives. 
• There are many regularities and patterns 
in human behavior, but these tend to  
apply in only limited contextual situations 
and are likely to be different for different 
people, different cultures, and over time.
• “Soft positivism” (Kirsch, 2004)
 
Figure 1.  Reconciling the Extreme Ontological Positions of Interpretivist and Positivist Research on 
the Generalizability of Research Results 
 
Second, we believe that the things that social-science researchers seek to generalize to other settings are knowledge 
claims from their research studies.  Such knowledge claims are usually presented in the form of propositions, models 
or theories6 that the researchers believe explain the facts in both past research and their present studies.  There is 
always uncertainty about the truth of such sample-based findings.  Further, in the course of normal science, it is 
expected that over time, most theories will be replaced by new, better theories.  For example, UTAUT (Venkatesh et 
                                                          
4 Hunt (2003) devotes twenty pages (pp.198-218) to discussing what he describes as misconceptions about 
differences between positivism and interpretive/qualitative research.  He comes to a conclusion similar to Weber 
(2004), shown in the middle of Figure 1. 
5 For instance, due to different cultural mores (Leidner and Kayworth 2006), a theory that explains management 
behavior in corporate America today might not be valid for explaining management behavior in China or Thailand.   
6 Many definitions of theory exist (Gregor 2006). According to Neuman (2003: 50): "Theories contain concepts, 
their definitions, and assumptions. More significantly, theories specify how concepts relate to one another. Theories 
tell us whether concepts are related, and if they are, how they relate to each other. In addition, theories state why the 
relationship does or does not exist."   
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al. 2003) seems likely to replace TAM (Davis 1989) as our current best explanation of individual-user IT adoption 
and use, at least for the settings in which it and TAM have been tested so far. 
Note that our position in this paper on “what is generalized” differs from that of Baskerville (1996), who describes 
generalization as a two-stage process where (1) findings from a sample of things (which Baskerville terms the “base 
case”) are used to create a “general case”, then (2) characteristics of the general case are applied to predict outcomes 
in some “goal case”.  Under Baskerville’s view, which is a valid alternative to our conceptualization of 
generalization,:  
“A general case is an abstract, theoretical case that manifests a relevant subset of the characteristics of the base 
case (or shared characteristics of the base cases).” (p.9) 
In this paper, the things being generalized are sample-based knowledge claims, e.g. propositions, models, and 
theories. We do not conceptualize generalization in terms of some typical or base case.  
Third, we follow Palmquist et al. (2004) in distinguishing between “generalization”, meaning decisions made by 
researchers about the generalizability of their own findings to other settings, and “transferability”, meaning 
decisions made by readers about the applicability of someone else’s research findings to their own organization.  
According to Palmquist et al. (2004): 
“Transferability is a process performed by readers of research. Readers note the specifics of the research 
situation and compare them to the specifics of an environment or situation with which they are familiar. If there 
are enough similarities between the two situations, readers may be able to infer that the results of the research 
would be the same or similar in their own situation. In other words, they ‘transfer’ the results of a study to 
another context.” 
Truth 
As Hume (1739), Popper (1992), Dubin (1969), Shadish et al. (2002), Hunt (2002, 2003), Lee and Baskerville 
(2003), and many other philosophers and researchers point out, claims about generalizability from samples to entire 
populations can never be proven true in the true/false sense of formal logic:  
“No matter how many instances of white swans we may have observed, this does not justify the conclusion that 
all swans are white” (Popper 1992, 27).   
Faced with the logical impossibility of proving generalizations from samples to other settings true, if we as 
researchers wish to generalize—and developments in science over many centuries have shown repeatedly that 
attempts to make such generalizations have been useful—we have to soften our test of truth of an other-settings 
generalization.  
We have no desire to enter into a philosophical debate on the meaning of truth, but since our definition of other-
settings generalization relies on the term, we need to explain what we mean by “truth” in this paper.  In this paper 
we adopt Hunt’s (2003, 2003) scientific-realist position on truth7, and define the truth of an other-settings 
generalization as follows: 
                                                          
7 Hunt (2003) devotes an entire 300-page book to a review of various philosophies of science—from the early Greek 
philosophers (Socrates, Aristotle) through what he terms the “classical empiricists” of the sixteenth to nineteenth 
centuries (Bacon, Hume, Mill), the “classical realists” (Russell, Wittgenstein), “pragmatists” (Pierce), “logical 
positivists” (Schlick, Carnap), “falsificationalists” (Popper), “historical relativists” (Kuhn, Feyerabend), and 
“scientific realists” (Harre) of the twentieth century—and concludes by supporting Harre’s (1986) view that many 
philosophers have fallen into the trap of defining truth in such absolute terms that no knowledge claims can be 
described as true.  In his Table 7.1, Hunt (2003, p.239) classifies 24 different philosophical positions on truth—e.g. 
from the deconstructive postmodern to the theocratic—and concludes in favor of scientific realism’s position on 
truth: 
“In short, scientific realism proposes that (1) the world exists independently of its being perceived (classical 
realism), (2) the job of science is to develop genuine knowledge about that world, even though such knowledge 
will never been known with certainty (fallibilistic realism), and (3) all knowledge-claims must be critically 
Quantitative Research Methods 
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An other-settings generalization statement is true if it is True (in the binary, true/false sense of formal logic) 
beyond reasonable doubt, though such a statement is always to subject to later disconfirmation.   
Using this definition of truth as our criterion for accepting other-settings generalizations allows us to avoid the 
logical consequences of what Lee and Baskerville (2003) call Hume’s truism8. Since the propositions and theories 
we start with in generalizing are never True in the true/false sense of formal logic, and are likewise always subject to 
uncertainty and revision this is not an unreasonably limitation.  Truth beyond reasonable doubt is as close as any 
researcher can get to formal logic’s concept of Truth. 
Other-settings Generalization 
Although the English word “generalization” has many meanings, the generalization concept of interest in this paper 
is other-settings generalization:   
An other-settings generalization is the researcher’s act of arguing, based on the representativeness of the 
sample, that there is a reasonable expectation that a knowledge claim already believed to be true in one or 
more settings is also true in other clearly defined settings.   
In addition to using the word “true”, defined above, the preceding definition also uses the word “representativeness”.   
Judgments about representativeness are aided by considering Shadish et al.’s (2002) five principles, discussed 
shortly.  As a guide, the intuition of what we mean by “representative” is most easily conveyed using sampling logic 
(which, of course, does not necessarily apply to case studies) as follows:  
For the variables relevant to the study, statistics calculated from a representative sample are similar to those of 
the population from which the sample was selected. 
Other Authors’ Concepts Corresponding to Other-settings Generalization 
Table 3 shows some leading authors’ terms for other-settings generalization, including Campbell and Stanley’s 
(1963) frequently used term “external validity”. We would happily use their term (external validity) instead of 
introducing a new one (other-settings generalization), but “external validity” describes the degree of truth of other-
settings generalizations, and is not readily applied to the process of generalizing. Further, each term in Table 3 has 
so many ideas related to it that it seems wiser to coin a new term to describe what we argue is a particularly useful 
aggregation of ideas on generalization.  
The only contentious claim in Table 3 is that, despite Yin’s (1989, 1994, 2003) claims to the contrary, we argue that 
Yin’s statistical and analytical generalization are just two alternative logical pathways for justifying other-settings 
generalization.  Arguments supporting this contention are presented in Appendix 2. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
evaluated and tested to determine the extent to which they do, or do not, truly represent or correspond to that 
world (critical realism).  
8 Lee and Baskerville (2003: 224-228) present a four-page discussion of Hume’s truism.  The problem is well 
illustrated by the following example of inductive logic from Wood (2000): 
1. In past experience, all Fs have been Gs. 
2. Therefore, all future Fs will be Gs, or the next F will be a G. 
Unless one makes the further assumption that nature is uniform, proposition 2 cannot validly be drawn from 
proposition 1.  Further, any attempt to prove that nature is uniform suffers from the same problem: knowledge that 
nature has been uniform in the past does not ensure that it will be in future.  Hence Hume’s truism: “induction or 
generalization is never fully justified logically” (Campbell and Stanley, 1963: 17, emphasis added). 
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Concept corresponding to other-settings generalization 
Campbell and 
Stanley (1963) 
Campbell and Stanley’s external validity describes the degree of truth of other-settings 
generalizations.  This same external validity concept is discussed in later editions of the 
book, i.e., in Cook and Campbell (1979) and Shadish, Cook and Campbell (2002). 
Dubin (1969) Generalizing “to a larger domain”.  
Cronbach 
(1982) 
Cronbach (1982) suggests that discussions of generalization should be organized around 
four concepts: units (U), treatments (T), observations (O), and settings (S). Cronbach’s 




Yin’s concepts of statistical and analytical generalization are two alternative mechanisms 
for justifying other-settings generalization. Justification for this claim is provided in 
Appendix 2.  
Walsham 
(1995) 
Walsham’s third type of generalization, “drawing of specific implications” (p.79), 
corresponds to other-settings generalization.  He suggests that the following statement 
from Walsham and Waema (1994, p.171) is a generalization from the single interpretive 
case study: “An ad hoc methodological approach to the development of computer-based 
information systems, accompanied by a clear business focus, can lead to rapid systems 
development, but the price paid for such an approach can be inflexibility and a lack of 
adequate integration”.  Note the word “can” not “will”. The implication is that this 
statement is true in other (unspecified) settings.    
Klein and 
Myers (1999) 
Klein and Myers’ “theoretical general concepts that describe the nature of human 
understanding and social action” in the second half of the Principle 4 appear to be other-
settings generalizations.  To illustrate their Principle 4, Klein and Myers discuss the use of 
Latour’s actor-network theory in a paper by Monteiro and Hanseth (1996).  They say: 
“According to this theory, humans and non-humans are linked together into actor 
networks. The theory assumes that actors pursue interests, and that these interests can 
become inscribed in technical or social arrangements.” (Klein and Myers 1999, p.76).  
From an other-settings-generalization perspective, the preceding quotation describes a 




Lee and Baskerville’s (2003) paper on generalization is the most comprehensive summary 
to date of research thinking on generalization in the IS literature.  Their paper is intended 
to encompass the “many different concepts in the scholarly discourse on generalizability” 
(p.241).  Lee and Baskerville’s second types of EE and ET generalization, which involve 
generalization “beyond the sample or domain from which the researcher has actually 
collected data” (p.233), are other-settings generalizations. 
 
The Process of Other-settings Generalization 
The process followed in other-settings generalization is depicted in Figure 2.  Suppose that a proposition, model or 
theory, x, is believed to be true (i.e., beyond reasonable doubt) in one or more settings, e.g. in a case study in a 
single firm, as the result of a single experiment, or from an analysis of survey data (Figure 2, step 1). As a result of 
some stimulus (Figure 2, step 2) the observer formulates the view that there is a reasonable expectation that x is true 
in other clearly specified settings beyond the scope of the initial study (Figure 2, step 3).  At that moment, the 
observer has generalized to other settings. 
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1. Prior Knowledge: proposition or theory, x, is believed true 
in one or more settings.
2. Stimulus: e.g., analysis of data from a survey, experiment 
or case study.
5. Assertion about the truth of the new proposition based on 
arguments and evidence from 4.
3. New more general proposition: There is a reasonable 
expectation that x is true in the following clearly specified 
other settings.
4. Test the truth of the new proposition using arguments 
about the extent to which the sample is representative of the 
population, for the concepts involved in this proposition.Assessing the 






Figure 2.  The Process of Other-settings Generalization 
 
Under the view depicted in Figure 2, an “other settings” generalization is simply a shift in one’s mental view of the 
world: one asserts, based on the evidence to hand, that the phenomenon one believes to be true in one setting (e.g. in 
a case study in a single firm, multiple case studies, based on data from a survey, or from one or more experiments) is 
likely to be true in one or more other settings that one has not observed (e.g. other firms where similar contextual 
factors also exist, or the population of things from which the sample used in the experiment was drawn).  However, 
not all such assertions are true beyond reasonable doubt; they need to be tested.  This is where steps 4 and 5 in 
Figure 2 come in.  The only techniques human beings have for assessing the truth of other-settings generalization 
assertions are logic and more empirical testing.  One has to rely on induction, assumptions about the uniformity of 
nature, arguments about the “representativeness” of the sample, and subsequent empirical testing to provide support 
for one’s other-settings generalizations9.  (Inferential statistics and p-values are helpful only if the sample is a 
probability sample, and in practical research—including surveys, experiments, and case studies—few samples are. 
Appendix 1 shows that inferential statistics and p-values may be useful if the sample is representative of things in 
those other settings.)  Representativeness is therefore very important.  Criteria for claiming representativeness are 
discussed in the next section. 
                                                          
9 In this respect Weick (1984, p.117), citing McGuire (1983), states that “…empirical confrontation is not a test of 
whether a theory is correct; rather, it is a discovery process: to make clear what the theory means, disclose its hidden 
assumptions, and clarify the conditions under which it is true or false. Through a series of studies, one seeks to 
establish the theory's pattern of adequacy, that is, to articulate the settings in which its inevitable misrepresentations 
are tolerable or intolerable.” 
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Shadish et al.’s Five Principles for Generalizing 
The clearest guidelines that we are aware of for assessing representativeness come from Cronbach (1982) and 
Shadish et al. (2002).  Here we summarize Shadish et al.’s five principles for generalizing, which build on 
Cronbach’s Units, Treatment, Observations and Settings (UTOS) framework10.   
Shadish et al. (2002) suggest “that scientists make causal generalizations in their work by using the five closely 
related principles” shown in Table 4.  Each of the five principles in Table 4 is discussed in detail by Shadish (1995), 
and Shadish et al. (2002), so the reader can refer to them for more details.  In essence, however, Shadish et al. 
(2002) argue that since no two things are exactly identical, judgments about whether one set of things is similar to, 
or representative of, some other set of things, must be based on establishing that they are similar with respect to 
attributes that matter. 
 
Table 4. Shadish et al.’s (2002: Table 11.1, pp. 357-8) Five Principles for Generalizing 
1. Surface Similarity. Assessing the apparent similarities between study operations and the prototypical 
characteristics of the target of generalization. 
2. Ruling Out Irrelevancies. Identifying those attributes of persons, settings, treatments, and outcome measures 
that are irrelevant because they do not change a generalization.  
3. Making Discriminations. Identifying those attributes of persons, settings, treatments, or outcome measures 
that limit generalization. 
4. Interpolation and Extrapolation. Generalizing by interpolating to unsampled values within a range of sampled 
persons, settings, treatments, and outcomes and by extrapolating beyond the sampled range. 
5. Causal Explanation. Developing and testing explanatory theories about the target of generalization.   
 
To demonstrate why Shadish’s five principles are important, consider the following two sampling “realities” that 
researchers have to deal with.  First, if questionnaires are sent to a random sample from a well-defined population, 
and the response rate is of the order of 30%, one simply cannot argue that the sample of respondents is random.  To 
use “inferential statistics” or “statistical” generalization as Yin (2003) calls it, one is therefore forced to build a case 
for the representativeness of the sample, e.g. as discussed in Appendix 1.  Second, researchers frequently seek to 
make general claims from case studies, experiments, or convenience samples (e.g. from surveys not based on 
probability sampling from a well-defined population).  To use what Yin (2003) calls “analytic” generalization 
(discussed in Appendix 2), one must again build the case around claims of representativeness.  In both situations 
Shadish et al.’s five principles are helpful for understanding what makes a sample (under which heading we include 
a single case study) representative of some broader class of things.   
The intuition behind Shadish et al.’s principles is illustrated by the following example.  Suppose that one has access 
to a convenience sample of data from 100 alumni from a business school at a Jesuit-backed11 university in North 
America.  Would knowledge claims based on analysis of that sample be representative of all business-school 
graduates in North America?  The answer, we now show, depends on the proposition being generalized.  If, say, the 
proposition concerns “behavioral intention to use a new technology”, we argue that it is likely that the opinions, 
thinking, and patterns of behavior of these Jesuit-university-educated managers would be representative of North 
                                                          
10 Cronbach’s 1982 book, Designing Evaluations of Educational and Social Programs, is a excellent source of well-
informed views on the generalization of social-science research findings.  For space reasons, a comprehensive 
summary of Cronbach’s UTOS framework is not provided in this paper. However, use of this framework for 
discussing generalization is strongly recommended.  Shadish et al. (2002) provide a useful summary of the 
framework.   
11 Christian Roman Catholic 
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American business school graduates, and probably of graduate managers, generally, in North America12.   However, 
if the proposition to be generalized relates to reasons for approval or otherwise of birth-control techniques, we argue 
that because of their Roman Catholic backgrounds, the opinions of these managers would not be representative of 
North American managers generally.  In short, representativeness needs to be demonstrated for the key factors 
related to the proposition being generalized. 
Shadish’s five principles in Table 4 formalize the intuitive reasoning in the previous paragraph.  Principle 1, surface 
similarity, is a simple initial test: Do things in the sample “look like” things in the population?   In terms of the 
preceding alumni example—where the proposition of interest is intention to use a new technology—we judge that 
the managers in the convenience sample “look” more like graduates from other North American business schools 
than they “look” like, say, North American engineers or North American priests.  However, this notion of “looking 
like” something is still too fuzzy. Which features should one look for and which features should one ignore?  
Principle 2, ruling out irrelevancies, tells us to look for differences in factors that matter for the proposition being 
generalized.  In terms of the alumni example, religious beliefs are probably irrelevant for propositions about IT 
usage decisions.  Principle 3, making discriminations, suggests that the researcher should identify boundary 
conditions beyond which generalizability claims do not apply.  In the case of IT usage decisions, interest in 
technology is likely to be an important factor.  Engineers, as a group, are probably more interested in IT than either 
MBA graduates or priests, and since intrinsic interest in the technology is likely to be an important factor 
determining intention to use, generalizability claims based on MBA graduates may not apply to engineers.   
Principle 4, interpolation and extrapolation, involves using variance in the existing dataset to assess the sensitivity 
of research findings to variance in key concepts, and use this to predict variability in the instances not studied.  For 
example, differences in responses between younger and older respondents in the sample may assist researchers in 
making judgments about applicability of their findings in various target populations.  Finally, Principle 5, causal 
explanation, suggests that if cause and effect are believed to be understood, those cause-and-effect concepts are the 
ones to consider in assessing whether the sample is representative of the other settings of interest.  In terms of our 
example, if the theory is that perceived usefulness and ease of use predict intention to use a new technology, then 
grounds for generalization are most soundly based on whether members of the sample and target population “think 
the same way” about usefulness and ease of use of IT.  Graduates of other business schools in the US probably do. 
Engineers may.  Priests in the US may not. Children in the US probably do not.  And finally, Buddhist monks in 
Thailand almost certainly do not. 
Future Discussions of Generalization in IS Research 
Having (a) established that the state of generalizability practice in IS research is unsatisfactory, and (b) defined 
“other-settings generalization” and shown how representativeness may be demonstrated, in this third part of the 
paper we now ask: How should generalizability be discussed in future IS research reports?  In other words, what 
should IS researchers say about the other-settings generalizability of their findings, and how much should they leave 
to their readers to make their decisions about the relevance of the findings to the reader’s own situation 
(transferability)?  In Table 5 we present three necessary elements for sound discussion of other-settings 
generalization in IS research papers. 
Element 1 simply recognizes that since IS is an applied discipline, empirical IS research that does not discuss both 
generalizability and boundary conditions is logically incomplete.  It also recognizes that discussing where claims 
might not apply may be very helpful to readers making transferability decisions.    
Element 2 recognizes that generalization of knowledge claims from empirical studies relies solely on whether the 
subjects in the sample studied are representative of the target population.  For sampling-logic research, e.g. surveys, 
discussion of other-settings generalizability would often involve simply trying to be more explicit about the 
sampling frame and population from which the sample was drawn, and revealing any concerns about non-response 
bias or choice of sampling frame causing lack of representativeness (King and He 2005).  For small-sample studies, 
e.g. case studies or ethnographies, discussion of other-settings generalizability would often involve attempts to 
                                                          
12 For this particular proposition, one way to convince readers that the sample is representative would be to compare 
proportions of males to females, proportions of managers of different ages, proportions in different discipline areas, 
and so on, with known proportions in the population of North American graduate managers.   
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define contexts where one would expect knowledge claims from the sample studied to also hold.  IS researchers can 
operationalize Recommendation 2 by drawing on the vocabulary provided by Cronbach’s (1982) UTOS or *UTOS 
framework and Shadish et al.’s (2002) five principles for generalizing in their discussions.   
Table 5. Necessary Elements for Discussing Other-settings Generalization in IS Research Reports 
Element Why this element matters 
1:  IS researchers should 
discuss explicitly the other-
settings generalizability of 
their knowledge claims, 
including  delineating 
clearly the boundaries 
beyond which their 
knowledge claims might 
not apply.   
In our applied discipline, empirical research that does not discuss both 
generalizability and boundary conditions is logically incomplete. Table 2 
shows that only 50% of the 70-odd papers where generalizability was 
relevant in ISR and MISQ in 2003 and 2004 discussed generalizalizability, 
and only 20% discussed boundary conditions.  If these 70-odd papers are 
representative of the top IS literature—and logic says that they probably 
are—many IS papers are logically incomplete.  The problem is that results 
based on an analysis of, say, IT usage in half a dozen US companies in 
1999, do not necessarily apply in other contexts, e.g. in US homes, in US 
primary schools, in Sri Lankan businesses, or in Thai monasteries.  Yet, 
without explicit statements to the contrary, readers may assume that 
research results do apply in settings where the authors would not expect 
their theories to be relevant.   
2:  Other-settings 
generalization claims 
should be based on the 
representativeness of the 
sample. This involves 
comparing key attributes of 
the sample and target 
populations, e.g. using 
Shadish et al.’s (2002) 
principles in Table 4. 
Research that claims or implies generalizabilty to other settings, yet which 
does not establish sample representativeness for the theory of interest is 
logically unsound.  For example, in survey research, if one’s theory is about 
a relationship between x and y, one cannot establish sample 
representativeness by comparing attributes a and b for early and late 
respondents (unless a and b are logically related to x and y, respectively). 
Yet we can point to papers in our sample of 70 studies that compare early 
and late respondents on variables with no bearing on variables in the models 
tested.  It may be harder to demonstrate representativeness for case-study 
research, but this does not mean it should not be attempted.  
3:  IS researchers should 
discuss known 
uncertainties or misgivings 
in all claims of other-
settings generalization. 
Given their own intimate knowledge of their data, research methods, etc., 
researchers should be in a better position than readers to understand the 
limitations and boundary conditions of their knowledge claims.  For the 
same reasons that pharmaceutical companies include warnings about known 
adverse reactions to their drugs on their packages, so, good research reports 
should try to help readers—both practitioners and researchers—make 
sounder judgments about the transferability of research findings. 
 
Element 3 follows from our scientific-realist truth definition which means that OSG claims are based on a 
reasonable expectation of wider applicability (which may subsequently be shown to be incorrect).  It relies on the 
joint beliefs that (a) IS researchers have a responsibility to document known uncertainties and misgivings when 
making other-settings generalizations, and (b) some discussion of generalization is more useful than a blanket 
disclaimer of no generalizability, e.g. of case-based IS research.  
In providing this advice, we are aware of the risk that authors and reviewers might honor the “letter of the law” in 
Table 5, and not the spirit of that advice.  For instance, a researcher could simply claim that his or her results are not 
generalizable beyond the dataset studied.  If so, the IS research community would be no worse off than at present.  
But our suspicion is that many researchers would welcome the opportunity to discuss openly their views about the 
likely generalizability of their findings to other settings.  Perhaps some sort of “safe harbor” clause like that used 
when US firms present their financial statements (see the U.S. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995) 
would give researchers the freedom to say what they believe is likely to be true, rather than just that for which they 
have strong evidence.  In the fullness of time, some claims of generalizability would, of course, prove to be wrong.  
This would provide valuable lessons for future researchers. 
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Applicability of the Arguments in this Paper to other Disciplines 
Finally, in a paper advocating the inclusion of a discussion of other-settings generalizability at the end of all 
empirical IS studies, it would be remiss of us not to discuss the applicability of our arguments to other disciplines.  
Our position is that although our evidence of unsatisfactory generalization practice—from Lee and Baskerville 
(2003), King and He (2005), and our own analysis discussed in the first quarter of this paper—is limited to IS 
research, none of the key characteristics of other-settings generalization summarized in Table 1 is specific to IS 
research, so the recommendations in Table 1 should apply to any social-science research.  (This is a Step-3-of 
Figure 2 knowledge claim; it still needs to be tested.)  
Conclusion 
The contribution of this paper is the aggregation of ideas we have called “other-settings generalization” (OSG) and 
the recommendations that flow from this concept, presented in Table 5.  OSG is arguably the most important subset 
of the range of concepts presented in Lee and Baskerville’s (2003) generalization framework.  This set of ideas 
provides a clear, simple conceptualization of generalization that should be useful for future IS research, positivist or 
interpretive, quantitative or qualitative.   
An other-settings generalization is the researcher’s act of arguing, based on the representativeness of the sample, 
that there is a reasonable expectation that a knowledge claim already believed to be true in one or more settings is 
also true in other clearly defined settings.  As summarized in Table 1, OSG includes (a) recognition that all human 
knowledge is bounded, (b) recognition that all knowledge claims—including generalizations—are subject to 
revision, (c) an ontological assumption that objective reality exists, (d) a scientific-realist definition of truth, and (e) 
a distinction between generalization and transferability.  Further, sound other-settings generalizations of research 
findings satisfy the following three requirements: 
1. The researcher must clearly define the larger set of things to which the generalization applies; 
2. The justification for making other-settings generalizations ultimately depends on the representativeness of the 
sample, not use of statistics;   
3. Representativeness is judged by comparing key characteristics of the proposition being generalized in the 
sample and target population.   
Having (a) shown that present practice is unsatisfactory, (b) presented our aggregation of ideas, we then (c) argued 
that practice would be much improved if IS researchers included in their empirically-oriented papers an explicit 
discussion of the other-settings generalizability of their findings, e.g. in the Discussion section of their papers.  Such 
discussions, which could be framed in terms of Cronbach’s (1982) Units, Treatments, Observatations and Settings 
(UTOS) framework and Shadish et al.’s (2002) five principles, would reveal assumptions and limitations of the 
study more effectively than is often the case at present.  A particularly effective approach seems to be to focus on 
the causal drivers of whatever theory is in use in the paper (Principle 5), then to explore grounds for believing that 
those factors apply or do not apply in other settings. Although Shadish’s principles do not lead to black and white 
answers about other-settings generalizability, they are very helpful.  Further, they clearly demonstrate that making 
sound other-settings generalization always involves human judgment.   
Finally, we return again to the reasons why discussion of OSG is important in future IS research.  First, IS is an 
applied discipline. It is therefore important that the implications for practitioners of IS research findings be discussed 
as clearly and openly as possible.  Second, with increasing globalization of IS research, limits to generalizability of 
findings between different contexts need to be discussed more clearly than they have in the past.  Third, since all 
knowledge claims are bounded, academic rigor demands that boundaries of applicability of any knowledge claims 
be carefully delineated.  The three elements of a rigorous discussion of OSG are summarized in Table 5. 
Appendix 1: Generalizing Using Inferential Statistics 
Inferential statistics, or “statistical generalization” as Yin (2003) calls it, is concerned with drawing conclusions 
about a population based on observations of a probability sample selected (usually from a sampling frame) from that 
population.  Any empirical study that reports a p-value (often indicated by notations such as “**, p<0.05”) has 
generalized relying on this logic.  However, not all empirical studies acknowledge that: 
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“The Achilles’ heel of statistical practice and inference is the selection of the sample.  A probability model is 
required to draw inferences.”  (van Belle, 2002, p.2) (emphasis added) 
In practice, researchers rarely use random samples from well-defined populations (or sampling frames) because 
random samples are extremely difficult to collect.  However, if the sample is not randomly selected, the probability 
theory that underpins inferential statistics is not directly useful for making generalizations.  In the absence of 
random sampling, one has to resort to arguments about the representativeness of the sample to justify drawing 
conclusions about a population based on findings from a sample. 
The inference logic when working with representative—as opposed to random—samples can be summed up as 
follows:   
1. First one must establish that the sample is representative of some well-defined population.  Such judgments are 
based on arguments similar to those from Shadish et al. (2002) presented in the body of the paper. They may well 
not involve statistics.  For surveys, a common technique for attempting to establish representativeness is to compare 
early and late responses.  What seems not to be well understood is that it is essential that variables relevant to the 
study are compared, not just any old factors that happen to be available. 
2. Second, given a representative, but non-random, sample (e.g. responses from a typical survey where an author has 
presented evidence that the sample is representative of the target population), two arguments can be used for 
drawing conclusions about the population from which the sample was drawn.   
Argument 1: Since the sample has been judged to be representative of the population, phenomena (e.g. means 
and path coefficients) observed in the sample correspond directly to phenomena in the population.  In this case, 
just as when working with an entire population, no inferential statistical analysis is required. 
However, since the estimate of population parameters is based on a sample, readers and reviewers will tend to ask 
questions about the confidence limits associated with such estimates.  For example, Goodhue et al.’s (2006) Monte 
Carlo simulations show that sample-based estimates of path coefficients in their Table 1 do not always match those 
in the population.  Therefore, most researchers pursue the second argument as well, or instead of, the first argument.  
Argument 2: Since the sample has been judged to be representative of the population, it is equivalent to, or may 
be treated as, a random sample from the population13.  One then applies the logic of inferential statistics to 
construct confidence intervals and estimate probabilities (p-values) that a null hypothesis is wrongly rejected.  
Although few studies make this clear, and few studies clearly define their assumed population, all published 
research studies that use non-random samples yet report p-values implicitly rely on this generalization logic. 
The p-values are indicators of the researchers’ confidence that null hypotheses can be rejected in the population 
from which the sample is assumed to have been drawn. 
Conclusion on Representative Samples  
This need to demonstrate representativeness of the sample (in terms of key criteria in the study) is rarely discussed 
in inferential-statistical analysis in published IS research.  But for all except true random samples, it is a critical 
assumption in the logical chain that gives meaning to the computed p-values, t-statistics, etc.  Even for true random 
samples, researchers would prefer representative random samples, because evidence of representativness is grounds 
for believing that estimated population parameters are more likely to be within the desired (e.g. 95%) confidence 
limits.  Thus, sample representativeness is a key requirement for generalization based on inferential statistics. 
Appendix 2: Other-Settings Generalization and Yin’s Analytic Generalization 
Yin (1989, 1994, 2003) is probably the most frequently cited authority on positivist case-study research.  Through 
three editions, his book has proven very useful for countless case-study researchers.  Yin argues strongly that 
                                                          
13 In fact, if it is truly representative on dimensions important to the study, distributional properties of the x’s and y’s 
and of the relationship between them will be more similar to those in the population than some random samples.  
This is because one deliberately sets out to exclude random samples (that might have been selected by chance) with 
distributional properties very different to the population.   
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generalization from case studies uses a different logic than that used in generalizing survey-based research.  
Specifically, he says that case study and experimental researchers “generalize to theory” using what he calls analytic 
generalization14, whereas survey researchers generalize from samples to populations using what he calls statistical 
generalization15. To help clarify the meaning of other-settings generalization, we now compare our OSG concept to 
Yin’s generalization concepts.   
Our position is that we agree with Yin that theory generated from case studies may be validly generalized to other 
settings, and we agree that the logical pathways for analytic and statistical generalization are different, but we feel it 
is important to point out that both are other-settings generalization, and further, that the underlying logical basis for 
generalization in both logical pathways—the logic underlying the pathways—is the same in all other-settings 
generalization.  In this Appendix, we demonstrate that  
(a) Both “analytic” and “statistical” generalization are simply examples of other-settings generalization,  
(b) Although the pathways or mechanisms for justifying analytic and statistical generalization are different, the 
underlying logical basis for all other-settings generalization relies on the representativeness of the sample. 
Yin’s position on analytic and statistical generalization is stated most clearly in the following quotation:  
“The external validity problem has been a major barrier in doing case studies. Critics typically state that single 
cases offer a poor basis for generalizing. However, such critics are implicitly contrasting the situation to survey 
research, in which a sample (if selected correctly) readily generalizes to a larger universe. This analogy to 
samples and universes is incorrect when dealing with case studies. Survey research relies on statistical 
generalization, whereas case studies (as with experiments) rely on analytical generalization. In analytical 
generalization, the investigator is striving to generalize a particular set of results to some broader theory” (Yin, 
2003, p.37, emphasis in the original). 
(a) “Analytic” and “statistical” generalization are both other-settings generalization  
Although we agree with Yin that the logical pathways used in statistical inference and in generalizing from case 
studies to other settings are different, we argue that both are forms of other-settings generalization.  With respect to 
samples and universes, the logic for statistical generalization is that, based on findings from a random or 
representative sample, assertions are made about relationships that probably exist in the population.  This is other-
settings generalization, namely, from the sample to the population.  Turning now to case studies and experiments, 
the logical pathway for asserting broader applicability of the findings no longer uses statistics, but the result is the 
same.  Based on arguments about the similarity of factors or subjects in the case or experiment and some other 
broader setting, the researcher argues that cause and effect relationships believed to exist in the case study or 
experiment will also apply in those other, broader settings. 
For example, consider generalizing the findings from Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect-theory experiment.  
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) conducted their experiments with 72 subjects from Israel in the late 1970s, and 
discovered that their subjects’ attitudes toward risk aversion and risk seeking were different.  In reporting their 
results, they seem to assume that these attitudes apply to all adult human beings, across all cultures, not just the 
subjects tested16.  The only way to justify such a generalization is to argue that in making decisions such as those in 
the experiment, the sample of subjects is representative of all other people.  The logical pathway for reaching this 
conclusion is not based on the probability calculations of statistical generalization (inferential statistics), but the 
consequence is the same.  Based on findings from a sample of 72 subjects, conclusions are drawn or implied about a 
broader population of things, in this case “all people”.  This, too, is other-settings generalization. 
                                                          
14 Level-2 inference in Yin 2003, Figure 2.2, p.32. This figure is reproduced in Lee and Baskerville (2003, p.222). 
15 Level-1 inference in Yin 2003, Figure 2.2, p.32. 
16 Kahneman and Tversky (1979) mention “essentially identical” results with “groups of students and faculty at the 
University of Stockholm and at the University of Michigan” (p.264-265).  This helps give the reader more 
confidence in the generalizability of their results to other settings, but the limits of applicability are not discussed 
explicitly. 
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(b) The logic underlying other-settings generalization is representativeness of the sample  
Although the mechanisms for justifying analytic and statistical generalization are different (quantitative studies may 
use inferential statistics, case studies do not), the logic underpinning both analytic and statistical generalization relies 
on the representativeness of the sample.  In the case of analytic generalization, this is almost self-evident.  For 
example, in Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect-theory-experiments example above, the only grounds for 
generalizing from the finding with the 72 students is to assume that their attitudes toward risk aversion and risk 
seeking apply to all adult human beings, across all cultures.   Likewise, if Robey and Sahey (1996) had wished to 
generalize their conclusion (based on two case studies of organizations using geographical information systems) that 
“information technology’s consequences are socially constructed”, the only logical grounds for so doing is to argue 
that the various social pressures that led to ITs consequences being socially constructed in their two case studies are 
also likely to exist in other settings, i.e., that relevant aspects of their case studies are representative of those other 
settings.  In short, the grounds for analytic generalization clearly rest on the representativeness of the sample.  
The grounds for believing that statistical generalization also relies on the representativeness of the sample have been 
presented in Appendix 1.  In a nutshell, that argument is that while sample statistics such as regression coefficients 
and coefficients of determination (R2) may be calculated from a sample without any consideration of the population 
from which the sample has been drawn, as soon as the researcher starts to consider tests of significance (e.g. t-tests, 
p-values) he or she has embarked into generalization territory.  At this stage, the population must be clearly defined 
and the researcher must ask if the sample is (a) random, (b) representative, or (c) neither (e.g. a convenience 
sample).  For other than random samples, representativeness must be demonstrated before one can argue that 
inferential statistics have meaning.   
Summarizing, although the pathways or mechanisms for justifying analytic and statistical generalization are 
different, the underlying logical basis for both, and therefore for all other-settings generalization relies on the 
representativeness of the sample.  Guidelines for deciding what factors to consider when assessing 
representativeness are presented in the discussion of Shadish et al.’s principles in the body of the paper. 
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